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Abstract
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integration into international equity markets is found to be a robust determinant of risk sharing for emerging
and developing countries over the period 1987-2003.
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11 Introduction
The expected risk sharing benets of nancial integration have proven dicult to substantiate empirically.
This paper attempts to establish the degree of consumption risk sharing that is due to cross border debt and
equity assets and liabilities by running panel regressions on a large sample of rich and developing countries
over the period 1970-2004, in a framework which relaxes some of the assumptions that have been maintained
in the literature.
As pointed out by Backus and Smith (1993), in the presence of segmented goods markets, perfect nan-
cial markets need not imply perfect cross-country consumption correlations. This means that the level of
consumption correlations may be an unreliable indicator of the use of nancial markets for risk sharing. This
paper focusses on attempting to establish the marginal eect of debt and equity (foreign direct investment
and portfolio equity) assets and liabilities on consumption correlations, rather than looking at the correla-
tion levels. Previous studies have often combined equity and debt holdings into a single nancial openness
indicator. In contrast, it is argued that it may be necessary to simultaneously allow for separate risk sharing
properties of debt and equity, and strong empirical support is found for this contention.
This paper also contributes to the literature by examining risk sharing in a framework which is robust to
the possibility that some countries may be more exposed to \global" risk than others, and to the estimation
biases to which this could lead. This generalisation of the classic risk sharing regression makes it marginally
easier to detect a risk sharing eect of nancial openness among OECD countries over the period 1987-2004.
The regression setup used allows for a real exchange rate role in consumption dynamics, consistent with
many open economy macroeconomic models. The estimation also controls for the possible eects of habit
formation in consumption, whereby current consumption may depend on previous values of consumption.
The results arising from alternative methods of de
ating current price data as well as alternative data sources
are compared. The conclusion that nancial integration does facilitate risk sharing, particularly in the period
1987-2003/4, appears robust across data sources.
Section 2 reviews some empirical approaches to testing risk sharing. Section 3 develops the framework
used to test for the eect of nancial integration on risk sharing. Section 4 describes the data sources and
empirical methodology, while Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
22 Empirical Tests of Risk Sharing
A classic question in international macroeconomics is whether nancial integration leads to consumption
risk sharing. Trade in contingent claims should enable risk sharing and the decoupling of consumption and
output. Such trade should lead to an increase in cross country consumption correlations, as consumption
would respond increasingly to common (aggregate) output risk rather than domestic risk. A model in the
International Real Business Cycle literature which has this implication is that of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992), who also establish the lack of empirical evidence to support this prediction.
Some of the approaches to measuring consumption risk sharing and the associated empirical results are
summarized in Table 1. In the setting of Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007), aggregate values are subtracted
from the domestic series, giving \idiosyncratic" values, as the common risk represented by aggregate values
is assumed to be uninsurable. The aggregate values are calculated as the average over the sample of OECD
countries examined. The authors' approach allows the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyn-
cratic GDP to be a function of nancial openness. If risk sharing occurs, increased cross-border nancial
holdings should allow the two idiosyncratic series to become decoupled, which should lead to a negative 1.
This is closely related to the approach of Sorensen et al (2007), where the coecient of idiosyncratic
output is allowed to depend on a country's equity home bias and a time trend, among other measures.
Equity Home Bias is measured as 1 - (share of country i's holdings of foreign equity in country i's total
equity portfolio / the share of foreign equity in the world portfolio). Home bias is therefore zero for a country
that shows no preference for equity issued domestically, and one for a country whose equity is completely
domestically invested. Kose et al examine a set of 72 countries, including 51 developing countries, whereas
Sorensen et al concentrate on the OECD countries. Kose et al nd that nancial 
ows help improve risk
sharing by industrial countries in the globalization period (1987-2004), although the magnitude of the eect
would appear small: an increase in the stock of foreign assets and liabilities equal to 100% of GDP is seen
to decrease the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic output from 0.744 to 0.725. The
average value of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities for the industrial countries is 265%. Cross-border
nancial holdings do not appear to facilitate risk sharing for emerging countries or over other periods than
the globalization era.
Other studies examine variants of the above regression equation. Artis and Homann (2007) run a
regression in log levels instead of log dierences on OECD countries over the period 1960-2000, which
3should capture more long term risk sharing. They nd an increase in risk sharing by OECD countries in
the globalization period, but also nd that international nancial holdings do not completely explain this
increase. Bai and Zhang (2005), following Cochrane (1991), run two cross-section regressions on a sample
of 40 countries from 1973-1985 and 1986-1996, and nd that risk sharing remained static between these two
periods. Following a study by Mace (1991) that examined individual level data, Bai and Zhang also run a
panel regression with aggregate consumption as an explanatory variable and again nd no improvement in
risk sharing. The introduction of aggregate consumption on the right hand side allows a second test of risk
sharing based on this coecient, with the prediction under perfect risk sharing being a unitary coecient.
Crucini (1999) examines a similar equation to that of Bai and Zhang (2005), which has the growth rate
of permanent income in place of that of output. Crucini nds signicantly more risk sharing among the
Canadian and United States than among G7 countries. Huizinga and Zhu (2004) also test an equation
similar to that of Bai and Zhang, where aggregate consumption is omitted and the coecient of GDP is
allowed to depend on domestic and international equity and debt market development. They nd that
development of the domestic debt market is important for OECD countries, whereas development of the
international market is important for non-OECD countries. Moser et al (2004) run a panel regression on
a sample of EU countries and test for break points in the coecients. They conclude that the increasing
nancial links among EU countries between 1960 and 2002 have not lead to more ecient consumption risk
sharing.
The above studies primarily examine the dependence of personal consumption on GDP. Obstfeld (1995)
examines the dependence of consumption on GDP net of government consumption and investment (here-
inafter referred to as \net output"), rather than simply GDP. Yakhin (2004) also argues that net output is
the more relevant measure for studying consumption risk. Yakhin examines G7 countries and runs cross-
section regressions of consumption correlation on GDP and net GDP. The author nds that netting out
government consumption and investment reverses the rank of the consumption and net output correlation
coecients for many pairs of countries, suggesting that examining net output may be important.
Several hypotheses have attempted to explain the weak empirical evidence for the risk sharing benets of
nancial integration. The presence of non-tradable and durable goods may help to explain the discrepancy.
Stockman and Tesar (1995) present a model with non-traded goods, but nd that this cannot reduce predicted
consumption correlations to a realistic level. Lewis (1995) nds that allowing for non tradable goods in
conjunction with capital market restrictions leads to the nding of some risk sharing among OECD countries,
4however, as the author points out, this result may be due to the low power of the test she conducts. Heathcote
and Perri (2000) examine the role of market incompleteness and conclude that observed correlations match
those expected under nancial autarkey better than other asset structures, which begs the question of why
international nancial holdings continue to grow exponentially if they do not provide the expected risk sharing
benets. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007), inter alia, suggest that the absence of nancial derivatives based
on a broad measure of national output may partly explain the low observed correlations, however it seems
possible that such \Shiller securities" (Shiller, 1993) could be adequately proxied by a portfolio of currently
available securities.
If purchasing power parity does not hold, consumption may be expected to depend on the real exchange
rate. Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) claim that segmented goods markets can account for low observed con-
sumption correlations, which is one of the reasons why the present paper concentrates on nding a marginal
risk sharing eect of nancial integration. Ravn (2001) points out that allowing for the possible eect of
the real exchange rate is necessary in consumption risk sharing regressions, since if countries face the same
nominal interest rate then real exchange rate movements are equivalent to real interest rate dierentials, and
will lead to intertemporal substitution of consumption. Ravn regresses consumption growth on aggregate
consumption growth and the growth in the real exchange rate, and nds that the real exchange rate is rarely
a signicant predictor, which casts doubt on the role given to it in a number of international macroeconomic
models. He concludes that the data do not consistently support a role for nancial markets in risk sharing,
based on a sample of twelve OECD countries. His results are robust to non-separabilities in the utility
function and the decomposing of consumption goods into durables, non-durables and services. Ravn also
nds evidence in favour of habit persistence, although introducing lagged consumption growth to allow for
this does not alter the results. Fuhrer and Klein (2006) develop a model incorporating habit persistence
and show that habit formation can generate positive consumption correlation in the absence of risk sharing,
suggesting that the evidence in favour of international portfolio diversication may be even weaker than it
appears.
The model developed below incorporates many of the features mentioned in this review, while relaxing
some of the assumptions. In contrast to the approach of Kose et al (2007) among others, the exposure to
aggregate risk is not assumed to be common across all countries. The risk sharing benets of international
debt and equity holdings are also allowed to dier.
5Study Sample Findings and Remarks
cit   cat = i + t + (0 + 1foit)(yit   yat) + "it
Kose et al (2007) 21 OECD + 51 Devel-
oping Countries
Risk sharing only by OECD countries during the period
1987-2004. Financial Openness is measured in a number of
alternative ways, including as equity and debt stocks and

ows.
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1(EHBit   EHBt) + 2(t   t))(yit   yat) + "it
Sorensen et al (2007) OECD Countries,
1993-2003
Strong equity home bias eect on consumption smoothing.





Large increase in consumption risk sharing which interna-
tional capital income 
ows cannot completely explain. i
is allowed to depend on a country's cumulative asset and
equity trade relative to its total nancial wealth.
ct =  + 
yt + "t
cit =  + cat + 
yit + "it
Bai and Zhang (2005) 21 Developed and 19
Developing Countries
Panel and cross-section regressions were run over 1973-85
and 1986-1996. In both cases there was no increase in risk
sharing despite the increase in nancial integration.
cit = i + icat + 
i(yit   yat) + "it
Moser et al (2004) Sample of EU Coun-
tries
Coecients were tested for structural breaks. No improve-
ment in risk sharing was found.
ct =  + cat + 
(yt   it   gt) + "t
Obstfeld (1995) Germany and Japan Increasing comovement with aggregate net output in the
period 1973-1988.
Table 1: Some Empirical Studies of Consumption Risk Sharing. c
stands for per capita private consumption, y for per capita GDP,
the i subscript indicates country, a indicates aggregate, and fo
stands for nancial openness. EHB is Equity Home Bias, i is in-
vestment and g is government expenditure, both per capita.
63 Risk Sharing Model
As pointed out by Backus and Smith (1993), perfect consumption correlation is not expected in the pres-
ence of non-traded goods, so this paper focusses on attempting to establish an eect of nancial holdings
on consumption correlations and hence risk sharing, as opposed to testing the null hypothesis of perfect
correlation. Mace (1991) derived the equation
cit = i + cat + 





n 1 and yit stands for household i's income at time t, as the solution to a social planning
problem in the presence of common endowment shocks. In Mace's case the sum was over all households
in an economy, here it is over all other countries in a sample. Aggregate consumption (and output) thus
vary by country, however the country index is omitted for clarity. Under the null hypothesis of perfect risk
sharing  = 1 and 
 = 0. As Mace points out, the errors include preference shocks and measurement errors.
The risk sharing implications were shown to hold under general conditions for the number, separability and
durability of goods. Bai & Zhang (2004) tested this equation on international data with output substituted
for income. Moser et al (2003) tested a similar equation, in which aggregate output was subtracted from
domestic output. Here it is proposed to replace aggregate consumption by aggregate output:
cit = i + 
yit + yat + "it (2)
This equation can also be seen as a generalisation of the equation examined by Kose et al (2007), where
the coecient of aggregate output is not constrained to be  
. This is done because some countries may
display greater sensitivity to aggregate risk than others. Under perfect risk sharing and abstracting from
problems such as market frictions and non-traded goods, one would expect 
 = 0 and  = 1. The aggregate
output series is intended to capture movements in output that are common across the OECD and potentially
other countries, however the appropriate aggregate series is not known and must be estimated. Section 3.2
presents some arguments in favour of allowing the coecients of aggregate and domestic output to dier.
It seems plausible that net output (output net of government consumption and investment) is more
appropriate than output in such regressions, since consumers can only share the output remaining after
government consumption and investment, as Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) argue. Yakhin (2004) provides an
7alternative intuition: net exports can be thought of as a shock absorber for smoothing private consumption.
Regressing consumption on consumption plus the shock absorber will give a measure of the degree of risk
sharing. The empirical analysis in this paper is therefore run with net output in place of output. It should be
noted that for the purpose of regressions run in this paper, y refers to GDP net of investment and government
consumption.
3.1 Modelling Domestic Comovement
Comovement of domestic consumption with domestic GDP may depend on nancial integration. In the
context of Equation (2), one possible formulation for this dependence is:
cit = i + (
0 + 
1eoit + 
2doit)yit + yat + "it (3)
where eoit and doit designate equity (portfolio equity and FDI) and debt openness (assets plus liabilities as a
proportion of GDP), respectively. Equity holdings imply state contingent returns. If a portion of the returns
to output is not available to domestic consumers because it is claimed by foreign equity liability holders, this
should decrease the dependence of domestic consumption on domestic output. The same is true of foreign
equity assets held by domestic investors to the extent that an increase in such assets indicates less exposure
to domestic equity.
Whereas equity openness may provide insurance against domestic output risk, debt assets and liabilities
may allow buer lending and saving, respectively. This would also decrease the dependence of consumption
on domestic output. These considerations would lead to negative 
1, 
2. The returns to debt assets are also
state contingent since default may occur and because the returns to longer term debt assets may vary with
a country's monetary policy. Since the mechanisms aecting the predictions for 
1 and 
2 are dierent, it
appears necessary to allow separate terms for equity and debt openness. While high debt openness indicates
access to international debt markets, low openness does not necessarily imply low access, but perhaps only
low utilisation, which would not rule out use of debt to buer risk in bad times. Equity openness could also
be an eective indicator of access to debt markets, which highlights the diculty of separating the eects of
debt and equity.
It may be the case that equity and debt provide alternative and not complementary methods of decoupling
consumption from output. If a large portion of the returns to domestic output are claimed by foreign
8investors, the marginal risk sharing and buering benets of debt assets and liabilities may be less than
for a country with low equity liabilities. Similarly, a country which can eectively buer domestic risk
may benet less from equity portfolio diversication. For these reasons the interaction term eoitdoityit is
also examined in the empirical analysis. It would be expected that this term would enter with a positive
coecient, decreasing the decoupling of consumption and net output caused by the risk sharing terms.
The estimation of the risk sharing eects of nancial openness may be subject to a number of biases. It is
possible that debt and equity holdings may appear to increase the dependence of domestic consumption on
GDP. Suppose during some period GDP growth in excess of the long term rate (the constant should remove
the long term rate from consumption growth) follows an autoregressive process. If not all consumers are
forward looking, then comovement between consumption and GDP will increase during this period. More
precisely, if GDP does not follow a random walk, so that E[yit+1jIit] need not equal long term growth,
where Iit is some information set, then in the presence of \rule of thumb" consumers (consumers who
are not forward looking, in other words whose consumption varies with income), it may be expected that
comovement with domestic GDP increases during periods when growth exceeds long term trend growth,
and vice versa. Equity and debt holdings may also respond to such short or medium term trends, in
other words eoit = e+(E[~ yit]) and doit = d+(E[~ yit]), where the tilde indicates the excess over the long
term growth rate and E is the expectation operator. Kose et al (2007) note that nancial 
ows may be
procyclical, and suggest that this procyclicality may prevent consumption smoothing, presumably by the
simple mechanism that there are less nancial assets available for insurance when insurance is most needed.
The concern here is rather with the potential bias caused by the procyclicality of both nancial holdings
and domestic comovement. In periods of positive (expected) excess growth, which may also be periods of
high comovement, debt and equity liabilities might increase as companies seek funding for expansion. Thus
a positive association could arise between comovement and nancial asset holdings, leading to positive 
1,

2. This would constitute a bias against nding a risk sharing eect of nancial openness.
3.2 Modelling Aggregate Comovement
The aggregate output term is intended to capture global risk, in other words risk to which every country
is exposed. As such aggregate movements in output may also be re
ected in domestic consumption. If
aggregate output re
ects global risk, this would suggest adopting a simpler formulation, such as that of
9Kose, Prasad & Terrones (2007):
cit   cat = i + t + (yit   yat) + 
foit(yit   yat) + "it (4)
Here the dependent variable is idiosyncratic consumption, that is, consumption controlling for (subtracting)
its aggregate value. Supposing a negative 
, Equation (4) assumes that, under risk sharing, nancial openness
increases dependence on aggregate GDP to the same extent to which it decreases dependence on domestic
GDP. An alternative approach is to allow a varying eect. This could be introduced to Equation (2) by
allowing the aggregate coecient to depend on nancial openness:
cit = i + (
0 + 
1eoit + 
2doit)yit + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)yat + "it (5)
The reasons for allowing this freedom are:
1. The possible bias in the estimation of the coecients of the interaction variables with domestic net
GDP, 
1 and 
2 (discussed in the previous section), does not apply to the coecients of the interaction
variables with aggregate net GDP, 1 and 2. If the bias exists, adding the constraints 
1 =  1 and

2 =  2 may make it more dicult to detect a risk sharing eect than if 1 and 2 are unconstrained.
2. The estimation of 1 and 2 may be subject to a bias that does not apply to 
1 and 
2, such as the
possibility that periods of high domestic/aggregate comovement are associated with high nancial asset
holdings because high domestic/aggregate comovement is associated with stability, which could lead
to an increase in foreign investment. This would bias in favour of nding risk sharing in the aggregate
resource interaction variables. Constraining the coecients may make it more dicult to detect such
a bias.
3. Domestic and aggregate (global) shocks may be dierent in nature, aggregate shocks may for instance
be more permanent (Sorensen et al, 2007). The ability of nancial holdings to insure or buer against
risk may therefore depend on the source of that risk, which would make the constraints 
1 =  1 and

2 =  2 inappropriate.
For these reasons the equation estimated by Kose et al (2007) and others:
cit   cat = i + t + (0 + 1foit)(yit   yat) + "it (6)
10is generalised to
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)(yit   yat) + 3eoit + 4doit +  Zit + "it (7)
and further to
cit = i + (
0 + 
1eoit + 
2doit)yit + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)yat
+3eoit + 4doit +  Zit + "it
(8)
where  Zit signies other explanatory and control variables, listed below. Both equations are estimated
and the results are compared. The equation is also estimated allowing for an interaction eect between risk
sharing due to debt and equity assets and liabilities:
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1eoit + 1doit + 3eoitdoit)(yit   yat)
+3eoit + 4doit + 5eoitdoit +  Zit + "it
(9)
It should be noted that an \adding up constraint" may apply to the coecient of aggregate net output. As











The coecient of aggregate consumption would be trivially one in the the absence of other regressors.
This constraint may also apply to some extent to aggregate net output, since aggregate net output is
correlated with aggregate consumption. The nancial openness variables still explain deviations from average
comovement, but in the presence of this constraint average comovement is constrained to be unity for OECD
countries. The implications of this constraint are discussed in Appendix B..
3.3 Other Explanatory Variables
The growth rate of the real exchange rate (rit, the Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate) is incorporated
to allow for the possibility (suggested by Giannone & Reichlin (2005) and Ravn (2001), inter alia) that
consumption depends on the real exchange rate.
In the presence of risk sharing, consumption should be high in countries where prices are low. One model























is derived, with  standing for the coecient of relative risk aversion and P representing the price in a
common currency. This condition becomes cit = cat+ 1
rit when expressed in growth rates. Because of
this relation the rate of growth of the real exchange rate is added linearly to the baseline regression equations.
In order to test whether consumption in more nancially integrated economies shows stronger positive
dependence on the growth in the real exchange rate, which would occur if international payments allow
countries to take advantage of cheap prices, the coecient of the real exchange rate is also allowed to depend
on nancial openness. The risk sharing coecients are also allowed to depend on the real exchange rate, as
suggested by Sorensen in comments appended to Giannone & Reichlin (2005).
3.4 Control Variables
The following variables are included as controls:
1. The levels of the equity and debt openness to net GDP ratios are included since the interaction model
would be misspecied in their absence, as explained in Brambor et al (2006) among others. These
variables are included in the three baseline specications, whereas the remaining two control variables
are not.
2. The rst lag of the dependent variable is included to control for the possible eects of habit formation, as
Fuhrer and Klein (2006) show that such a habit process could by itself lead to consumption correlation.
3. Trade openness is included individually and in interaction with net output as it could be a predictor of
a country's ability to buer and smooth against output 
uctuations, to the extent that it proxies for a
country's creditworthiness. A country that is highly integrated into the world goods market may nd
it easier to adjust its balance of payments to allow it to borrow in order to stabilise consumption in the
face of a domestic output shock. Thus a nding that trade openness leads to decreased dependence
on domestic GDP could be partly due to the use of international nancial markets to buer or hedge
domestic risk.
124 Data Sources and Empirical Methodology
This paper follows Kose et al (2006) in dividing the period 1970-2004 into 1970-1986 and 1987-2004 (period
of high nancial integration). The models are estimated via OLS regression. Aggregate values are calculated
over the rest-of-OECD21.
4.1 Data Sources
Current price output, consumption (household consumption), investment (gross xed capital formation) and
government consumption are taken from UNSTATS (2007). Aggregate values are calculated by summing
over all OECD countries for non-OECD countries and all other OECD countries for OECD countries, then
dividing by total (remaining) OECD population. Consumption and net output are made per capita using
population data from Penn World Tables 6.2, then de
ated to 2000 prices using national consumer price
indices, taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, then converted to dollars using the 2000
purchasing power parity exchange rate, taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2. This approach follows
Sorensen et al (2007).
Data on nancial openness are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti's (2007) External Wealth of Nations
II (EWN) dataset. Financial openness ratios are calculated based on GDP from the EWN, which is taken
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, rather than UNSTATS. The nancial openness data
refer to end of year values and so have been lagged by one year. The t subscript in these variables refers to
the end of year t 1 value, which is appropriate for measuring risk sharing in year t. The nancial openness
variables have been centred by subtracting their mean values over the relevant (unbalanced) samples.
The regression is also run on international price data, for which consumption, investment and output are
taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Trade openness is calculated as the sum of imports and exports of
goods and services divided by GDP, taken from UNSTATS.
4.2 Price De
ators
Sorensen and Yosha (2002) argue for the use of the CPI to de
ate not only consumption but also output
(or net output), a practice which is followed here. De
ating output by the output de
ator would eliminate
changes in the purchasing power of output in terms of consumption goods. This is undesirable since the
possible response of consumption to such changes is of interest here. The disadvantage of this approach
13is that it does not allow for adjustment to an output shock via a change in the internal terms of trade
(Homann, 2007), in other words diverging consumer and producer prices. Not allowing for this channel
could lead to an articially high observed dependence of consumption on output.
Homann (2007) points out that the use of an idiosyncratic price series as the de
ator may be inappro-
priate as it fails to account for international price dierentials. He observes that regional risk sharing studies
generally de
ate consumption and output by a common (national) consumption price de
ator, whereas in-
ternational studies generally de
ate the series using an idiosyncratic (also national) price de
ator. The rst
type of regression examines comovement in the values of the series, the second in the quantities. There are
arguments in favour of each approach. De
ating by idiosyncratic prices fails to account for the possibility
that comovement in idiosyncratic price de
ated data could be due to the existence of international price
dierentials, and not the absence of risk sharing (and vice versa). On the other hand, de
ating by a common
price series may retain national price dierentials that aect the degree of comovement but are not caused
by and do not facilitate risk sharing. Homann runs a regression using aggregate prices as the de
ator, and
nds that the results are closer to those seen among regional regressions. To control for the above consid-
erations, the analysis is run on data from the Penn World Tables 6.2, which uses aggregate price series, as
well as national CPI de
ated data. The real exchange rate is also added as a control.
5 Empirical Results
There is strong evidence that nancial openness leads to risk sharing as measured by the comovement of
consumption and net GDP (GDP net of government consumption and investment) in the period 1987-2004
for both OECD and Non-OECD countries. The 21 country subsample of OECD countries are referred to
as \the OECD countries". \Non-OECD" refers to the sample excluding the Persian Gulf countries and
Overseas Financial Centres. The countries comprising the samples analysed here are listed in Appendix A.
The coecient of equity holdings in Column 2 of Table 2 implies that an increase in equity holdings
equal to 100% of GDP with no accompanying change in debt openness would lead to a 96% decrease in
the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic GDP. This is a larger eect than is usually
found in the literature. Kose et al (2007) nd that an increase in equity openness equal to 100% of GDP
would decrease the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic gross output by 12%, although
Sorensen et al (2006) nd a much larger eect of equity home bias on consumption risk sharing. Their
14Risk Sharing Regression (1), PWT Data
Dependent Variable: OECD Non OECD
cit   cat 1973-1986 1987-2004 1971-1986 1987-2003
nyit   nyat 0.258** 0.309*** 0.134*** 0.220***
(0.089) (0.062) (0.048) (0.080)
eoit(nyit   nyat) 0.439 -0.298*** 0.295 -0.328**
(0.508) (0.102) (0.198) (0.137)
doit(nyit   nyat) 0.069 0.183*** -0.168 0.026
(0.126) (0.050) (0.185) (0.149)
eoit 0.016 0.008*** 0.008 0.004
(0.028) (0.003) (0.056) (0.021)
doit -0.007 -0.006** -0.030** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.014) (0.008)
rit -0.134** 0.000 -0.104*** -0.047**
(0.054) (0.001) (0.021) (0.022)
N 285 378 525 833
R2 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.11
Table 2: The estimated coecients are based on OLS regressions with country xed eects. nyit stands
for the growth rate of output net of government consumption expenditure and xed investment. The a
subscript indicates aggregate, calculated over the (rest of) OECD 21 country sample. doit and eoit stand
for equity and debt assets plus liabilities as percentages of GDP. rit stands for the growth rate of the real
exchange rate. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signicance, respectively. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. All panels are balanced. The four nancial openness related variables are jointly signicant
with a p-value of 0.053 for the OECD 1973-87 sample. The same test for the non-OECD countries over
1971-86 gives a p-value of 0.12. This suggests that over the earlier samples there may be some relationship
between consumption risk sharing and nancial openness which is obscured by the high collinearity among
the variables, however a graphical analysis of the GDP coecient as a function of nancial openness revealed
no support for this possibility.
15results suggest that a 100% decrease in equity home bias would lead to a greater that proportionate increase
in consumption risk sharing. The authors note, however, that the equity home bias coecient they nd
may not be applicable to such a large change. The debt coecient implies that the same increase in debt
holdings would lead to a 59% increase in the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic GDP.
It should be borne in mind that equity and debt openness are correlated, so that a large increase in one
while the other remains constant may be unlikely. The four nancial openness related variables are jointly
signicant at the 1% level for both samples over the later period.
The below graphs show the coecient of idiosyncratic net GDP from Regression 1:
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)(yit   yat) + 3eoit + 4doit +  Zit + "it (11)
The values shown are 0 + 1eoit + 2doit for levels of equity openness between 200% of GDP below and
above the average level, and for debt openness equal to the average (\Debt Openness = 0") and to 100%
of GDP above the average (\Debt Openness = 1") over the relevant sample. Under perfect risk sharing,
the coecient should be zero. Under no risk sharing (or buering), it should be one. The graphs also show
condence intervals of the coecients. These are equal to plus or minus twice the standard error of the
coecient, calculated as the square root of:
var(0 + 1eoit + 2doit) = var(0) + eo2
itvar(1) + do2
itvar(2)+
2eoitcov(01) + 2doitcov(02) + 2eoitdoitcov(12)
(12)
(the coecient and standard error formulae are adjusted as appropriate for the other regressions (2) and
(3), also reported below). This method of analysis follows the suggestions of Brambor et al (2006).
Where the growth rate of the real exchange rate is signicant the sign of the estimated coecient is
negative, opposite to that predicted by theory under risk sharing in the presence of non-traded goods. The
purchasing power parity exchange rate is taken as the measure of the real exchange rate (RER). An increase
in the domestic price level relative to the US level will, ceteris paribus, decrease Rit. The denition of
RER used is Rit = eit
pUSt
pit , where eit is the number of foreign currency units per dollar, pUSt is the dollar
price level and pit is the foreign price level. Under risk sharing, higher domestic prices should lead to lower
consumption, since the marginal benet of a dollar of consumption is higher in a country with cheaper
prices. This result may be driven by the nominal exchange rate. An increase in the nominal exchange rate
16could lead to higher import prices, which could aect consumption. The inclusion of nancial openness
interaction variables with the growth rate of the RER (eoitRit and doitRit) does not aect the sign of the
RER coecient.
20 OECD countries, 1973-1986
As seen in Figure 1, for most values of equity and debt openness, the 95% condence intervals of the estimated
coecient encompass the x-axis. It may be that the biases discussed in Section 3.2 or the lower degree of
nancial integration over this period make risk sharing dicult to detect.
21 OECD countries, 1987-2004
Figure 2 shows a strong risk sharing eect of equity openness, as predicted by theory. Debt openness shows
a weaker, opposing eect, which could be due to the biases discussed above or to debt facilitating increased
consumer spending during boom periods. The debt eect depends on Ireland's inclusion in the sample. The
implications for individual countries in the year 2003 are presented in Table 6, Appendix D.
35 Non-OECD Countries, 1971-1986
Figure 3 shows that, as in the OECD sample, over the earlier period the condence intervals of the coecient
encompass the x-axis regardless of the equity and debt openness values considered.
49 Non-OECD Countries, 1987-2003
Figure 4 shows a strong risk sharing eect of equity openness, similar to that found for the OECD countries
over the same period. The debt eect is insignicant, possibly due to the various roles debt plays in this
sample of countries, as nancing expansion during good times, as facilitating buer saving and lending, and
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Figure 4: Non-OECD 1987-2003 Net GDP Coecient
19Persian Gulf States and Overseas Financial Centres
Over the period 1971-86 the debt openness interaction variable appears signicant (Table 3) and consistent
with buering of output risk, but enters with a very small magnitude (Figure 5). Cross-border nancial
holdings do not appear to have facilitated risk sharing over the period 1987-2003. The estimation of cross-
border nancial holdings in these countries may be subject to greater measurement error than is associated
with the other two samples studied. The absence of any risk sharing eect is clearly seen in the two graphs.
The condence intervals in Figure 5 quickly blow up, while in Figure 6 the resource coecient as a function
of equity openness is essentially a straight line.
5.1 CPI-De
ated Data
The results using CPI-de
ated data are similar to those using the PWT data, however the CPI-de
ated data
show evidence of debt being used to buer risk by non-OECD countries over 1971-86 and of debt increasing
consumption dependence on net GDP among the same countries over 1987-2004, similar to the eect seen
among OECD countries over this period. Figure 7 shows the much stronger debt aect seen in CPI-de
ated
data for the non-OECD 1987-2004 sample, in comparison to the PWT results (Figure 4).
The results for Overseas Financial Centres and Gulf States (not shown) are very similar to those using
the PWT data. The similarity in the estimated coecients across data sources suggests that international
price dierentials do not signicantly aect risk sharing, although the inclusion of the growth rate in the real
exchange rate as a control variable plays some role in explaining this similarity, as it tends to be signicant
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Figure 6: Net GDP Coecient for Persian Gulf Countries and OFCs 1987-2004
21Risk Sharing Regression (1), OFCs and Gulf States
Dependent Variable:
cit   cat 1970-1986 1987-2003
nyit   nyat 0.486** 0.081
(0.184) (0.173)
eoit(nyit   nyat) 0.838 -0.053
(1.086) (0.111)










Table 3: nyit stands for the growth rate of output net of government consumption expenditure and xed
investment. The a subscript indicates aggregate, calculated over the (rest of) OECD 21 country sample.
doit and eoit stand for equity and debt assets plus liabilities as percentages of GDP. rit stands for the growth
rate of the real exchange rate. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signicance, respectively.
Risk Sharing Regression (1), CPI-De
ated Data
Dependent Variable: OECD Non OECD
cit   cat 1973-1986 1987-2004 1971-1986 1987-2003
nyit   nyat 0.232*** 0.290*** 0.336** 0.413***
(0.072) (0.059) (0.122) (0.120)
eoit(nyit   nyat) 0.615 -0.316** -0.187 -0.829**
(0.401) (0.132) (0.421) (0.386)
doit(nyit   nyat) -0.305 0.210** -0.455* 0.371***
(0.203) (0.079) (0.225) (0.079)
eoit -0.027 0.011*** -0.046 0.008
(0.023) (0.003) (0.069) (0.024)
doit -0.007 -0.008*** -0.058** 0.014
(0.006) (0.002) (0.022) (0.011)
rit -0.137** 0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(0.060) (0.001) (0.041) (0.018)
N 285 378 525 833
R2 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.30
Table 4: The results for CPI-de
ated data are similar to those using PWT data (Table 2). ***, ** and *
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Figure 7: Net GDP Coecient for Non-OECD Countries 1987-2004, CPI-De
ated Data
5.2 Regression (2): Equity/Debt Interaction
Allowing the risk sharing eect of equity holdings to depend on the level of debt holdings (this variable could
of course also be interpreted as the converse):
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1eoit + 1doit + 3eoitdoit)(yit   yat)
+3eoit + 4doit + 5eoitdoit +  Zit + "it
(13)
does not appear to oer further insights into consumption risk sharing. The debt/equity interaction term is
marginally signicant at the 10% level in the Non-OECD 1987-2003 sample using CPI data but not PWT
data, although the two regression results give a similar picture for the dependence of the coecient on
nancial openness (the relevant gures are available on request). These gures are consistent with the view
that introducing this term merely introduces more noise into the estimation. The average-debt line appears
to be the same as that of the Regression (1) estimation, whereas the line for above average-debt openness
countries shows no clear relationship between the risk sharing coecient and equity openness.
235.3 Regression (3): Non-Idiosyncratic Variables
This regression relaxes the assumption of an equal and opposite eect of nancial openness on the dependence
of consumption on domestic and aggregate GDP:
cit = i + (
0 + 
1eoit + 
2doit)yit + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)yat
+3eoit + 4doit +  Zit + "it
(14)
Financial openness does not aect the level of comovement of domestic consumption with aggregate net GDP
for any of the four samples. The high correlation of domestic and aggregate net GDP among OECD countries
(the Pearson correlation coecient is 0.35 over 1987-2004 and 0.43 over 1973-86, both signicant at the 1%
level) may be primarily due to factors not directly dependent on nancial integration, such as the common
eects of an oil price shock on demand in these countries. The corresponding correlation coecients for the
non-OECD countries are 0.11 (p-value 0.01) over 1971-1987 and 0.04 (not signicant) over 1987-2004. The
assumption that nancial openness increases the dependence on aggregate GDP to the same extent to which
it decreases dependence on domestic GDP appears unwarranted, however it does not interfere signicantly
with the results. The p-value of the equity interaction term for the non-OECD countries over 1987-2004
decreases from 0.021 (using Regression (1)) to 0.016 (using Regression (3)). Thus, dropping the unnecessary
assumption that the aggregate resource movements are always re
ected in the domestic resource movements
may make risk sharing slightly easier to detect, however the dierence is quite trivial. The similarity of
the results with and without subtracting aggregate values from domestic values re
ects the fact that the
aggregate series are more stable than the domestic series.
Figure 8 shows that among non-OECD countries nancial integration is concentrated on the liability
side, which would not give domestic investors claims on aggregate net output (the graph shows average
(uncentred) debt openness, but the same pattern is seen in equity openness). This may help to explain
the fact that aggregate net output is not a signicant predictor of domestic consumption for non-OECD
countries.
5.4 Robustness Checks
All regressions are based on the OLS estimator with country xed eects and robust standard errors. Al-
though the nancial openness variables appear to have unit roots, the errors from the regressions are sta-
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Debt Assets vs Liabilities, 1987−2004
Figure 8: Debt Assets vs Liabilities by Sample
tionary.1 All standard errors are robust to clustering of errors within countries (following Kose et al, 2006).
The risk sharing ndings are not aected by the introduction of the lagged dependent variable, lagged
trade openness (both separately and in interaction with idiosyncratic GDP), real exchange rate interaction
variables or (in the case idiosyncratic variable regressions) year dummies. The lagged dependent variable
is signicant only in the OECD sample, where it alters the coecients of signicant variables very little.
Including it leads to a higher dependence of consumption on net output in the steady state, but very nearly
the same relative eect of equity and debt openness (since their coecients and those of net output are
in
ated by the same factor), which are the variables of primary interest in this paper.
The results are generally unaected by the exclusion of individual countries. The exclusion of Ireland
renders the debt interaction variable marginally insignicant, but does not aect the signicance or magni-
tude of the equity interaction variable. The exclusion of Chad from the non-OECD 1987-2003 sample leads
to an increase in the p-value of the F-test for the joint signicance of the interaction variables using Regres-
1Referring to the results for the OECD, 1987-2004, and PWT data, the panel unit root test of Levin, Lin
and Chu (2002) rejects the null of non stationarity under any plausible specication, for example with two
lags and trend the t-star statistic is -7.19. The test of Im et al (2003) also strongly rejects the null hypothesis
that all series are non-stationary, with a W[t-bar] statistic of -2.72 allowing two lags in the residual from the
error process. The residuals from other regressions are similarly stationary, details are not reported.
25sion (2) from .001 to .031. The dependence of the aggregate resource coecient on nancial openness when
Chad is excluded (gure not shown) remains similar to that based on the results including Chad (Figure 4).
Excluding Zambia gives a larger debt eect with a negative coecient consistent with the possibility that
debt provides some buering of output risk. The in
uence of Chad on the results appears to stem from FDI
liabilities associated with the recently completed Doba basin oil project. Chad may represent an example
of risk sharing through equity holdings, since a signicant portion of the price risk of future oil earnings is
taken on by foreign investors.
6 Conclusions
Integration into the international equity and debt markets appears to have facilitated risk sharing for both
OECD and non-OECD countries over the period 1987-2003/4. The nding that non-OECD countries use
nancial markets for risk sharing runs counter to previous empirical ndings, and may have signicant policy
implications for countries considering their level of engagement in nancial trade. In the case of the 1987-
2003/4 period, the ndings are robust to both the data source and the method used to de
ate current price
series. There appears to be strong support for the use of a general framework to measure consumption risk
sharing which allows for separate eects of equity and debt openness.
Aanalysing idiosyncratic consumption and net output series (domestic growth rates net of the global
growth rate) is not necessary if the aggregate (OECD) movements are accounted for independently, and
may make it marginally more dicult to detect risk sharing. This suggests the possibility of a market for
trading aggregate risk, which is generally assumed to be uninsurable in the literature. Examining the nature
of macroeconomic risk that is common across non-OECD countries, if such risk exists, could shed further
light on risk sharing by these countries.
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29A Country Samples
A.1 21 Country OECD Sample
This sample of wealthy countries is the same as that used in Kose et al (2003).
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN),
France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Netherlands
(NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland
(CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), and United States (USA).
For regressions over the period 1973-86, Greece is excluded due to missing equity data.
A.2 49 Country Non-OECD Sample
This sample includes all Non-OECD21 countries for which all data (from both the Penn World Tables 6.2
and the CPI de
ated data) were available for all years from 1987-2003 (inclusive), excluding Persian Gulf
states and countries that are designated by the IMF as Overseas Financial Centres.
Argentina (ARG), Burkina Faso (BFA), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Botswana (BWA), Chile
(CHL), Cote d'Ivoire (CIV), Cameroon (CMR), Colombia (COL), Dominican Republic (DOM), Algeria
(DZA), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), Ethiopia (ETH), Gabon (GAB), Ghana (GHA), Guatemala (GTM),
Honduras (HND), Hungary (HUN), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Iceland (ISL), Jamaica (JAM), Jordan
(JOR), Kenya (KEN), Korea (KOR), Sri Lanka (LKA), Madagascar (MDG), Mexico (MEX), Malaysia
(MYS), Nigeria (NGA), Nepal (NPL), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Poland (POL), Paraguay
(PRY), Senegal (SEN), El Salvador (SLV), Swaziland (SWZ), Chad (TCD), Togo (TGO), Trinidad and
Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), Tanzania (TZA), Uganda (UGA), Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
(VEN), South Africa (ZAF), Zambia (ZMB).
A.3 35 Country Non-OECD Sample
This sample includes all Non-OECD21 countries for which all data (from both the Penn World Tables 6.2
and the CPI de
ated data) were available for all years from 1971-1986 (inclusive), excluding Persian Gulf
states and countries that are designated by the IMF as Overseas Financial Centres.
Chile (CHL), Cote d'Ivoire (CIV), Cameroon (CMR), Colombia (COL), Dominican Republic (DOM),
Algeria (DZA), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), Ethiopia (ETH), Gabon (GAB), Ghana (GHA), Guatemala
30(GTM), Honduras (HND), India (IND), Iceland (ISL), Jamaica (JAM), Jordan (JOR), Kenya (KEN), Korea
(KOR), Sri Lanka (LKA), Madagascar (MDG), Malaysia (MYS), Nigeria (NGA), Nepal (NPL), Pakistan
(PAK), Paraguay (PRY), Senegal (SEN), El Salvador (SLV), Swaziland (SWZ), Togo (TGO), Trinidad and
Tobago (TTO), Turkey (TUR), Tanzania (TZA), Venezuela, Rep. Bol. (VEN), South Africa (ZAF).
A.4 Persian Gulf States and Overseas Financial Centres
This sample is not exclusive of countries in the other two samples. It consists of all Persian Gulf states and
countries that are designated by the IMF as Overseas Financial Centres for which all data were available
over the relevant period. The 1987-2003 balanced sample consists of: Bahrain (BHR), Switzerland (CHE),
Costa Rica (CRI), Cyprus (CYP), Hong Kong S.A.R. of China (HKG), Israel (ISR), Japan (JPN), Mauritius
(MUS), Panama (PAN), Philippines (PHL), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Singapore (SGP), Thailand
(THA), Uruguay (URY).
The balanced sample from 1971-1986 consists of: Bahrain (BHR), Switzerland (CHE), Costa Rica (CRI),
Israel (ISR), Japan (JPN), Mauritius (MUS), Singapore (SGP), Thailand (THA).
B The \Adding Up" Constraint
If consumption were regressed on aggregate consumption instead of aggregate net output in Regression
(2), an adding up constraint would apply to the estimated coecients. Since aggregate consumption and
aggregate net output are highly correlated, the constraint may still be relevant. By construction of aggregate
consumption, within the OECD subsample, if one country's consumption growth exceeds the average, another
country's growth must fall short. Thus in a panel regression:
cit = i + 
yit + cat + yat + "it (15)
the coecient of aggregate consumption must be one. If the coecient varies by country:
cit =  + icat +  (16)
its average must be one.
31If it is a function of nancial integration,
cit =  + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)cat +  (17)
again its average must be one.
In the absence of an adding up constraint, the interaction variables in Equation (17) would explain
deviations from 0, which is common across countries. This remains true in the presence of the adding up
constraint, but now the coecients are constrained by 0 + 1eoit + 2doit = 1, in other words they now
explain deviations from one. As long as this interpretation is noted, the constraint poses no problem.
C Average Financial Openness Values
Observations Equity Avg. Debt Avg.
OECD 1973-86 336 0.19 0.66
OECD 1987-2004 378 0.82 1.57
Non-OECD 1971-1986 1664 0.12 0.46
Non-OECD 1987-2003 1872 0.25 0.93
OFCs and Gulf States 1971-1986 352 0.18 2.18
OFCs and Gulf States 1987-2003 396 1.79 4.13
Table 5: Average equity and debt to GDP ratios by sample. These values were subtracted from equity and
debt to GDP ratios in order to aid the interpretation of the regression coecients.
D Net GDP Coecients by Country
The below graph and tables show the coecient of net output from Regression (1):
cit   cat = i + (0 + 1eoit + 2doit)(yit   yat) + 3eoit + 4doit +  Zit + "it (18)
after accounting for the eects of equity and debt openness in 2003 based on the results in Table 2.
32Risk Sharing Coecients with Standard Errors, OECD 2003
COUNTRY  se() H0: =0 H0: =1
Sweden 0.03 0.13 F R
Canada 0.09 0.10 F R
Finland 0.11 0.11 F R
Australia 0.12 0.10 F R
Netherlands 0.13 0.14 F R
New Zealand 0.21 0.08 R R
Denmark 0.23 0.08 R R
United States 0.23 0.07 R R
France 0.24 0.08 R R
Spain 0.27 0.07 R R
Switzerland 0.29 0.13 R R
Ireland 0.29 0.23 F R
Norway 0.31 0.06 R R
Japan 0.35 0.06 R R
Belgium 0.37 0.09 R R
Italy 0.37 0.06 R R
Germany 0.39 0.06 R R
Greece 0.46 0.07 R R
Portugal 0.55 0.08 R R
Austria 0.57 0.08 R R
United Kingdom 0.62 0.08 R R
Table 6: Column (1) reproduces the coecients from Figure 9 ( refers to 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003
- consumption dependence on idiosyncratic GDP), with standard errors in Column 2. Column 3 shows
the results of testing the null hypothess H0: 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003 = 0 (perfect risk sharing). F
stands for Fail to reject, R stands for Reject. Column 3 shows the results of testing the null hypothess H0:
0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003 = 1 (no risk sharing). All countries fall into two categories - the risk sharing
coecient is either statistically insignicantly dierent from zero (at the 5% level) and signicantly dierent
from one, or strictly between zero and one. The high standard error of Ireland's coecient is worth noting.
33Risk Sharing Coecients with Standard Errors, Non-OECD 2003
COUNTRY  se() COUNTRY  se()
Trinidad and Tobago -0.08 0.04 Poland 0.20 0.10
South Africa -0.05 0.04 Ethiopia 0.20 0.07
Chad -0.04 0.02 Egypt 0.20 0.09
Chile -0.03 0.03 Colombia 0.20 0.09
Papua New Guinea -0.03 0.08 Cote d'Ivoire 0.20 0.10
Malaysia 0.01 0.02 Senegal 0.21 0.08
Jamaica 0.03 0.04 Honduras 0.21 0.08
Bolivia 0.03 0.02 Tanzania 0.22 0.08
Tunisia 0.07 0.02 Jordan 0.22 0.09
Swaziland 0.07 0.10 Uganda 0.23 0.08
Hungary 0.08 0.03 Guatemala 0.23 0.13
Nigeria 0.09 0.03 Paraguay 0.24 0.09
Zambia 0.10 0.12 Cameroon 0.24 0.10
Argentina 0.13 0.24 India 0.24 0.14
Togo 0.13 0.08 Sri Lanka 0.25 0.10
Iceland 0.15 0.11 Pakistan 0.25 0.11
Ghana 0.15 0.09 Algeria 0.25 0.12
Venezuela 0.15 0.06 Gabon 0.26 0.10
Botswana 0.16 0.10 Kenya 0.26 0.11
Ecuador 0.16 0.06 Turkey 0.26 0.10
Mexico 0.17 0.11 Indonesia 0.26 0.10
Dominican Republic 0.17 0.10 Madagascar 0.27 0.10
El Salvador 0.18 0.08 Bangladesh 0.27 0.14
Korea, Republic of 0.19 0.11 Burkina Faso 0.27 0.12
Poland 0.20 0.10
Table 7:  refers to 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003 - consumption dependence on idiosyncratic GDP. The
coecients are taken from Table 2, Column 4, and  is calculated using 2003 equity and debt openness
values. Standard errors are shown in Column 2. The null hypothesis H0: 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003 = 1
is rejected at the 5% level for all countries. The null hypothesis H0: 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003 = 0 is not
rejected at the 5% level for 20 of the 49 countries. It appears that nancial openness explains a considerable
amount of cross-sectional variation in risk sharing in 2003. The high standard error of Argentina's coecient
(coecient 0.13, standard error 0.24) is worth noting.























Dependence of Consumption on Net Output
Figure 9: Dependence of Idiosyncratic Consumption on Idiosyncratic GDP by Country, OECD. The de-
pendence measure was calculated as 0 + 1eoi;2003 + 2doi;2003, with the coecients taken from Table 2,
Column (2). The red line shows the coecient of idiosyncratic GDP for a country with average equity and
debt openness.
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